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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS 281
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-SUBSTITUTION OF WoRD.-A statute was passed
by the Florida legislature authorizing the Board of County Commissioners to
issue and sell bonds for building roads. The bonds were to bear interest at 6
per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually and should "mature not more than
thirty days after date at such time or times as said board may determine by
resolution." Bonds were issued by virtue of this statute, but were to mature
within thirty years despite the wording of the act. The obvious intent of the
legislators was that thirty years should be the period of time instead of thirty
days. Held, that the word "years" could not be substituted for the word "days"
in order to validate the bonds. Osborne et al. v. Simpson, 114 So. 543 (Fla.,
1928).
This case involves the old question as to the extent of a court's power in in-
terpreting legislative enactments. Here the Florida court refused to strike out
a word of plain, definite meaning and substitute therefor a different word to
make it conform to what seemed to the court to be the intent of the legislature.
This same view was expressed in Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533, which
the principal case follows. The prevailing rule seems to be that courts are
bound to follow the plain words of a statute as to which there is no room for
construction, regardless of consequences. Commissioners of Immigration v.
Gottlieb, 265 U. S. 310, 68 L. Ed. 1031, 44 Sup. Ct. 528; Dusold v. U. S., 270.Fed.
574. Yet in Dorsey Land and Lumber Co. v. Board of Directors of Garland Levee
Dist., 136 Ark. 524, 203 S. W. 33, afrmed 249 U. S. 618, the court construed the
number 20 as number 29 in a statutory description of land, since 29 was the
only section answering the description. This indicates a much more liberal view
than that expressed in the principal case. The Arkansas courts seem to hold
that where there is an obvious error it is the court's duty to discard the error
and accept the obvious meaning of the framers of the statute. It is contended
that this is not reading into the statute something which is not there and that it
does not constitute judicial usurpation for the court to correct mistakes of the
legislature. The Arkansas courts proceed on the theory that mere interpreta-
tion of the language used by the legislators so as to ascertain the true intention,
without reading anything into it except that which was obviously meant, does
not amount to judicial legislation. Bowman v. State, 93 Ark. 168, 129 S. W. 80.
From the two lines of argument pursued in these conflicting cases, the decisive
factor would appear to depend upon just what constitutes objectionable judicial
legislation. As to just what constitutes objectionable judicial legislation the
courts are not in accord. Much will depend upon whether the court is inclined
to follow the strict, logical application of Osborne v. Simpson or the liberal and
more practical rule adopted in Dorsey Land and Lumber Co. v. Board of Direc-
tors of Garland Levee Dist. While logic and the trend of present authorities
support the rule laid down in the principal case, the results of a more liberal
rule in effecting the true intent of the legislature call in question the sound-
ness of the prevailing rule. However, in spite of the hardship caused at times
by the refusal of the courts to read into statutes words that are not there or to
strike out words which fail to express the legislative intent, sound public policy
supports the holding in Osborne v. Simpson in leaving the legislature respon-
sible for its own errors and in not thrusting upon the court the task of wording
statutes so as to express the intent of the legislature. On principle it is sub-
mitted that when the words used are plain and unambiguous, the court should
accept them without question, insofar as no need for interpretation exists.
K T. C., '28.
TAxES-INTEsT ON GovERNMENT BoNms.-Suit by insurance company to re-
cover excess taxes for five years. The taxes were exacted under 76.34 Wis-
consin Statutes 1923 which required domestic companies to pay 3 per cent of
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